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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 How to Use This Template 
This Planning Template provides a standard format for creating an Ebola Concept of Operations 
(ConOps) plan at the state, territorial, or major metropolitan area government level. It provides 
information on measures local governments, agencies, and organizations can take to support the 
plan. The chapters include the following: 
• Chapter 1: Information regarding the template, a background, and an Ebola ConOps 
overview 
• Chapter 2: Template that jurisdictions will use to develop their ConOps with 
recommendations on what each section will contain, including two sections that have 
local-level recommended actions 
• Chapter 3: Recommendations for training and exercising the resulting ConOps 
• Appendices: Acronyms and definitions 
1.2 Background 
Ebola virus disease, previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, is a rare and deadly disease 
caused by infection with one of the Ebola virus strains. Ebola can cause disease in humans and 
nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and chimpanzees). 
The 2014 Ebola epidemic is the largest and longest lasting in history, affecting multiple countries 
in West Africa, with more than 27,000 cases and more than 11,000 deaths reported as of July 
2015. A small number of cases were also reported in neighboring countries; however, these cases 
were contained, with no known further spread. 
At least 24 patients with Ebola were treated in Europe and the United States. Most of these 
patients were healthcare and humanitarian aid workers who contracted the disease in West Africa 
and were transported to and treated in their home countries. Two imported cases, including one 
death, and two locally acquired cases in healthcare workers were reported in the United States. 
Six health workers and one journalist were infected in West Africa and transported to the United 
States for treatment as well. 
This unprecedented epidemic prompted the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) to activate its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in July 2014 to help coordinate 
technical assistance and control activities with partners. CDC partnered with other U.S. 
government agencies, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other domestic and 
international partners on this global response. CDC deployed experts, built partnerships, and 
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strengthened existing projects to meet the growing need for Ebola surveillance, detection, and 
coordination. 
In response to the increasing concern of Ebola spreading to the United States from air travel, 
CDC began an enhanced entry screening and post-arrival active monitoring program with state 
and local health departments for all inbound air travelers from affected countries. The 
Department of Defense subsequently deployed more than 2,000 personnel into West Africa to 
provide logistical support, train healthcare workers, test medical samples, and build Ebola 
treatment centers (ETCs). 
In December 2014, Congress appropriated supplemental emergency funding to further support 
Ebola epidemic efforts domestically and internationally. The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and 
CDC issued four funding opportunity announcements (FOAs) to support Ebola preparedness and 
response in the United States. 
• CDC's Domestic Ebola Supplement to Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity for 
Infectious Diseases (ELC) – Building and Strengthening Epidemiology, Laboratory and 
Health Information Systems Capacity in State and Local Health Departments (CK14-
1401PPHFSUPP15) 
• CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Supplemental for Ebola 
Preparedness and Response Activities (CDC-RFA-TP12-12010302SUPP15) 
• ASPR's Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) Ebola Preparedness and Response 
Activities (CFDA #93.817) 
• ASPR's National Ebola Training and Education Center (NETEC) Cooperative Agreement 
(EP-U3R-15-003) 
Each of these FOAs reference plans has elements that could be included in a ConOps document. 
For example: 
• The ELC cooperative agreement requires 
o Assessing infection control competencies, identifying gaps in performance, and 
implementing response and prevention activities 
o Improving laboratory practices to include a requirement for a biosafety officer in each 
state, training staff, better coordinating among public health labs and clinical partners, 
and equipping laboratory facilities 
o Improving notification, surveillance, and monitoring of public health areas of concern 
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• The PHEP cooperative agreement requires 
o An updated ConOps that is coordinated and exercised with ELC and HPP 
stakeholders 
o Effective monitoring and management of Persons Under Investigation (PUIs) or 
patients confirmed with Ebola 
o The ability to quickly, safely, and accurately perform laboratory testing on suspected 
Ebola specimens to rule out or confirm the presence of Ebola 
o Protocols for screening at major airports and for rapid and appropriate public health 
actions (e.g., controlled movement, isolation, quarantine, or public health orders) 
o Collaboration with healthcare coalitions and systems to ensure personnel are properly 
trained on personal protective equipment (PPE) and the handling of contaminated 
waste and human remains 
o The development of messages, plans, and notification systems to share information 
and risk communication messages with relevant response partners and the public 
o Collaboration with healthcare system partners to design, develop, and implement a 
tiered network of hospitals within the jurisdiction capable of providing care to 
patients with Ebola and a plan to refer and transport PUIs and patients confirmed with 
Ebola to an appropriate location 
• The HPP cooperative agreement requires 
o Developing a ConOps that includes the tiered hospital approach, transport plans, and 
agreements and an active monitoring/direct active monitoring strategy 
o Hospital-level staff training focused on safety when caring for a patient with Ebola 
and exercises that include patient care and transportation 
o Enhancing hospitals' physical infrastructure for improved infection control 
procedures and infectious waste management capabilities 
o Improving coordination with healthcare coalition partners to provide access to PPE, 
training, and exercise support and improving interfacility transport systems 
o Integrating planning, training, and exercises with ELC and PHEP stakeholders 
• The NETEC grant establishes a program designed to increase healthcare and public 
health workers' competency and healthcare facilities' ability to deliver efficient and 
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effective care for patients with Ebola by providing expertise, education, training, and 
technical assistance. 
1.3 Definitions 
The following definitions explain the standard meaning of words or phrases used throughout this 
document: 
• Concept of Operations (ConOps) – A conceptual overview of the processes and steps for 
a properly functioning system or properly executed operation. This overview can include 
responsibilities and authorities, available resources, and methods to improve 
communications and coordination. 
• Jurisdiction – The state, territorial, and major metropolitan area awardees that receive 
funds through the ELC, PHEP cooperative agreement, and HPP grants. 
1.4 Ebola Concept of Operations 
For guidance in developing plans, jurisdictions should look at the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency's Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance 101 (CPG 101). The ConOps 
should augment a jurisdiction's All Hazards Emergency Operations Plan to 
Describe/identify the jurisdiction's specific concerns, capabilities, training, 
agencies, and resources that will be used to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from other hazards as defined in the jurisdiction's hazard analysis. 
The ConOps outlined in this template describes strategic, high-level considerations for 
establishing a regional tiered system to safely and effectively manage PUIs or patients confirmed 
with Ebola. Subsequently, it is meant to describe information provided and actions to be taken at 
the jurisdictional level. This includes what organizations and agencies within the regional tiered 
system must also accomplish to ensure this system functions as intended. Planners and 
responders who read this ConOps should have a clear understanding of how public health, 
healthcare organizations, emergency medical services, emergency management, and other 
partners work together to identify and care for PUIs or patients confirmed with Ebola within 
their region. The collaboration of partners working throughout the region and in jurisdictions 
fully supports the guidelines contained within the National Response Framework. Changes to 
guidance can affect portions of this template, so planners are encouraged to review content at 
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Planners for the jurisdiction will detail how each organization or agency supports the plan, which 
will include the mission for each organization or agency and the responsibilities necessary to 
support the jurisdiction's mission. Planners can then determine how they will execute their 
mission and fulfill their responsibilities. 
References 




• Federal Emergency Management Agency National Response Framework, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32230. 
1.5 Providing Feedback 
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Chapter 2 – The ConOps Template 
2.1 Introductory Material 
Jurisdictions should follow the guidelines on pages 3–12 in CPG 101 to develop the introduction 
for the plan, which will include the cover page, official authorization statement, approval and 
implementation page, record of changes, record of distribution, and table of contents. 
2.2 Purpose 
Jurisdictions may consider using this ConOps purpose statement: 
To inform local, state, and federal governments; relevant agencies and organizations; 
and other stakeholders of the preparedness and response plans specific to a case of 
Ebola in this jurisdiction. 
2.3 Scope 
This ConOps is limited to describing operational intent when responding to PUIs or patients 
confirmed with Ebola; however, with slight modification it can describe operations for 
responding to other diseases. Jurisdictions may have plans for bioterrorism or other infectious 
disease already in place and consistency between these plans should be maintained. The ConOps 
details a system developed for operations within the boundaries of the jurisdiction and within the 
HHS region, and provides information about agreements with other jurisdictions that support 
these systems. 
Planners will outline the jurisdiction's boundaries. The scope should include the legal authorities 
that govern the methods used to direct the response (e.g., public health laws, healthcare 
regulations). 
2.4 Situation Overview 
This section will contain information about the jurisdiction and the disease. The information 
about the disease should include how it affects people, how it is spread, and why it is a risk. The 
information about the jurisdiction will include population numbers, an overview of the 
healthcare system, starting with 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), and factors that 
might increase risks to the population (e.g., hub for international travelers, large diaspora 
populations from countries with outbreaks). The following are listed only as examples. 
2.4.1 Description of the disease 
Ebola is an infectious disease caused by the Ebola virus. Symptoms might appear from 2 to 
21 days after exposure and might include fever, headache, joint and muscle aches, weakness, 




Chapter 2 – The ConOps Template  12 
2.4.2 Transmission 
• Ebola is transmitted through direct contact with the blood or body fluids of an 
infected symptomatic person or through exposure to contaminated objects (such as 
needles). Recent case reports seem to indicate that the Ebola virus could remain in 
some body fluids (e.g., semen) of Ebola survivors longer than previously suspected. 
Therefore, transmission from asymptomatic survivors is possible 
• People are not contagious until they develop symptoms 
• People at highest risk for Ebola include healthcare workers and other people with 
direct contact with infected/symptomatic people 
• Effective isolation of patients and appropriate infection control measures can help 
contain any potential spread 
2.4.3 Description of jurisdiction 
Example: The state has a population of 12.7 million people spread over 46,000 square miles. 
A majority of the population (60%) live within the six largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 
The public health and healthcare coalitions have 8 regions and include 65 acute care and 
specialty hospitals, 216 primary care providers, 194 nursing homes, and 88 adult care 
facilities. There are 260 public and private emergency medical services (EMS) agencies 
across the state. The Metro International Airport in Capital City serves over 15 million 
passengers annually, and ten flights per week originate from the outbreak area. The airport 
has a CDC-staffed quarantine station. Capital City and Hoover City (200 miles west of 
Capital City) both have large populations that originate from outbreak-affected countries. 
2.5 Planning Assumptions 
This section will include the assumptions that affect the proper functioning of the system 
developed. These assumptions might include when leaders will activate command and control 
elements within the government and others such as 
• Notification of hospitals by EMS will occur at the earliest possible opportunity when 
transporting a PUI or multiple PUIs 
• Staff who work in hospitals and ambulatory care settings will be able to identify 
symptomatic people whose travel history could suggest possible exposure to Ebola or 
other diseases endemic to a region and be prepared to have and use appropriate PPE, 
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• Health officials in the jurisdiction will have a plan for transporting one or multiple 
patients who are confirmed with Ebola to an established Ebola treatment center within 
the jurisdiction or to one of the 10 designated regional treatment centers. 
2.6 Missions and Responsibilities 
This section should indicate the designated lead agency responsible for developing and 
overseeing the implementation of the ConOps, and should also outline the mission and 
responsibilities by emergency support functions or by agency or organizations. These might 
include 
• State level 
o Public health agency assists with coordination of public health actions 
o Department that provides legal advice and isolation and quarantine orders 
o Occupational safety and health administration assists in issues involving worker 
safety and unions 
o Department of transportation assists in contaminated waste transport and could help 
arrange air transport 
o Department of the treasury might provide budget assistance to support the response 
• Local level 
o Health departments 
o Hospitals 
o Healthcare coalitions 
o 9-1-1/PSAPS 
o Emergency medical services (public and private agencies) 
o Emergency management agency 
o Pollution control agency/hazardous waste management agency or companies 
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2.7 Intent 
In this section, the official or agency responsible for developing and executing the ConOps for 
the jurisdiction will describe how the various organizations and agencies will prepare for and 
respond to PUI or patients confirmed with Ebola. Also included will be how the jurisdiction will 
help those at the local level respond appropriately. This is meant to be a broad statement; details 
will be provided in section 2.9, Key System Elements. 
2.8 Critical Information Requirements 
The title of this section varies depending on the format jurisdictions use for their plans. Some 
might use "Essential Elements of Information." This section will describe the critical elements of 
information that must be reported to the jurisdiction (e.g., state health department, state 
emergency operations center) to facilitate a timely and proper response. In some cases, this 
information is also passed to federal agencies to improve the response at that level. Though not 
all-inclusive, for an Ebola response these requirements might include 
• All people arriving at a port of entry, hospitals, or clinics identified as low (but not zero), 
some, or high risk for contracting Ebola 
• All people confirmed with Ebola 
• The death of any person confirmed with Ebola 
• Incidents where first responders, healthcare workers, or the public have a known or 
suspected exposure to a person confirmed with Ebola 
• PPE shortages that could affect worker safety, or other medical product shortages or 
needs that could affect patient treatment 
2.9 Key System Elements 
CPG 101 recommends that plans include a framework for all direction, control, and coordination 
activities. Planners in jurisdictions will have a format for writing their plans, but each Ebola plan 
should include the following key systems elements and be reviewed to ensure they capture the 
recommendations for each element. 
2.9.1 Public Health Monitoring and Movement 
Designated public health departments are the likely agencies to be responsible for an active 
monitoring/direct active monitoring program (AM/DAM). This process begins by outlining 
the procedures, either by airport screeners or other public health agencies, which will be used 
to notify the public health department of a person requiring monitoring. In this section, a 
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• How those monitored will report their status—through daily checks or direct 
observation depending on their epidemiologic risk factors 
• How those monitored will report the development of Ebola symptoms on a 24/7 basis 
• How the jurisdiction will arrange for controlled movement, self-isolation, self-
observation or quarantine of people at risk for Ebola as the situation dictates and as 
the state law allows 
• What triggers prompt notifying of all necessary partners (especially hospitals and 
EMS) when a person being monitored exhibits symptoms of Ebola, including how 
and specifically where the hospital will receive a patient transferred from EMS 
• The procedures to initiate normal public health contact investigations to identify and 
locate those with potential exposure to Ebola and begin monitoring procedures as 
necessary and procedures for surge staffing to help with investigations 
• How to follow up with travelers lost or address travelers who are non-compliant (i.e., 
do not answer CARE phone, are not responding to e-mail and who do not contact or 
respond to reach out from public health) with monitoring 
• A plan for mapping people subject to AM/DAM to an Assessment Hospital that is 
prepared to provide initial evaluation and isolation as well managing differential 
diagnostic testing, transport of confirmed patient, and treatment of other illnesses 
• A plan, to include triggers, for discontinuing the program and for restarting the 
program should it become necessary 
References 
• Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola 
Virus Exposure, Updated December 24, 2014, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/monitoring-
and-movement.pdf. 
• Interim Guidance for U.S. Hospital Preparedness for Patients Under Investigation: or 
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2.9.2 Isolation and Quarantine Procedures 
Public health will outline the procedures to arrange for the self-isolation and quarantine of 
PUIs and describe the requirements from other jurisdictional agencies to support the 
procedures. This will include measures taken to provide shelter and meals. Should the person 
later be confirmed with Ebola the jurisdiction should have  arrangements in place for the 
decontamination of the residence, waste removal, and quarantine of pets (e.g., dogs and cats). 
Also included will be references to the laws and regulations that support these procedures. 
References 
• Cleaning and Decontamination of Ebola on Surfaces, 
www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA_FS-3756.pdf. 
• Interim Guidance for Dog or Cat Quarantine after Exposure to a Human with Confirmed 
Ebola Virus Disease, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/dog-cat-quarantine.pdf. 
• Interim Guidance for Public Health Officials on Pets of Ebola Virus Disease Contacts, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/pets-of-ebola-contacts.pdf. 
2.9.3 EMS Support at the Jurisdictional Level for the Transport of Persons Under 
Investigation or Confirmed with Ebola 
This section will provide information on how the jurisdiction can help facilitate the transport 
of PUI or patients confirmed with Ebola to a designated Ebola assessment hospital or ETC 
for further evaluation, testing, and possible hospitalization. CDC has developed guidance for 
EMS providers that includes patient assessment, safety and PPE, patient management, 
transport, and decontamination and is working on guidance about interfacility transport. 
Guidance at the jurisdictional level might be stricter. The EMS director for the jurisdiction 
can help develop plans on how the jurisdiction will 
• Provide guidance to 9-1-1 PSAPs about protocols for identifying calls related to 
people at risk for contracting Ebola 
• If necessary, coordinate with adjacent states to allow EMS to transport patients 
confirmed with Ebola through the state to a regional ETC 
• Coordinate with EMS to support the airport and with airport managers in situations 
where a PUI or confirmed with Ebola is transported by air 
• Coordinate EMS for intrastate facility-to facility transfer (e.g., frontline hospital to 
assessment or treating hospital) 
• Coordinate with EMS agencies to develop procedures and arrange for a transfer 
between two EMS vehicles to reduce long transport times 
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• Work with relevant regulating agencies to adjust the list of required equipment in an 
ambulance to limit potential contamination when transporting a patient with 
suspected or confirmed Ebola 
• Help EMS agencies coordinate with hospitals for the disposal of contaminated waste 
and decontamination of the ambulances 
• Work with local EMS medical directors to identify limited treatment protocols for 
PUIs or patients confirmed with Ebola during their transport 
References 
• Interim Guidance for EMS systems and 9-1-1 PSAPs for Management of Patients Who 




• Identify, Isolate, Inform: Emergency Medical Services Systems and 9-1-1 PSAPs for 
Management of Patients Who Present with Possible Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola) in the 
United States, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/ems-911-patients-with-possible-ebola.pdf. 
2.9.4 EMS Preparation Supporting the Transportation of Persons Under Investigation 
or Confirmed with Ebola1 
This section details what EMS agencies must do to support the jurisdiction's plan. The 
transportation of PUIs or patients confirmed with Ebola will be managed through EMS at the 
jurisdictional or local level depending on how the EMS system is regulated or controlled in 
the jurisdiction. Local EMS must prepare for PUIs or a patient, or patients, confirmed with 
Ebola coming from within the EMS system (9-1-1/PSAP calls); an interfacility transfer; or 
from a port of entry, such as an airport. Additional considerations include 
• The 9-1-1/PSAP medical director should consider how 9-1-1 calls for PUIs are 
operationalized and consider additional questions or actions specific to their local 
area or region 
• The EMS medical director should determine Ebola-specific protocols for EMS 
services, including on-scene assessment and treatment, and collaborate with public 
health agencies to determine the appropriate hospital destination 
  
                                                          
1 This subsection was added to provide guidance for local EMS agencies. 
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• EMS agencies should consider what ambulances or other EMS resources are 
dispatched for PUIs and how to ensure that arriving EMS have received adequate 
training in donning and doffing PPE and knowledge about what level of PPE to wear 
before entering the scene 
• Jurisdictions might consider designating select EMS agencies for interfacility 
transfers 
• Transportation should be considered for the following situations: 
o From quarantine station to an Ebola assessment hospital or ETC 
o From an airport that has agreed to receive a PUI or patient confirmed with Ebola 
transported by air medevac to an ETC 
o From a home or other location where a PUI might be self-monitoring for 
symptoms to an Ebola assessment hospital or ETC 
o From a medical provider's office to an Ebola assessment hospital or ETC 
o From an EMS vehicle to another EMS vehicle as part of an extended distance 
transport 
2.9.5 Implementation of the Healthcare Facility Tiered Strategy 
This section will outline the hospital tiered strategy for the management of PUIs or patients 
confirmed with Ebola within the region and the jurisdiction. This outline will include 
requirements for each tier in the strategy, especially if they differ from CDC guidance. 
Additionally, highlighting the legal authorities and regulations relating to the controlled 
movement of people suspected of carrying a highly infectious disease will help local officials 
determine how to manage PUIs and patients confirmed with Ebola. Plans should include 
• The identified need for tiers of prepared healthcare facilities within the jurisdiction 
based on the location of points of entry and locations of people subject to AM/DAM 
• How hospitals are selected to perform various roles within the system 
• How to assess hospitals to ensure that staff and facilities meet the requirements 
outlined for the facility 
• For those jurisdictions without an ETC, a list of plans, existing memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs), and procedures to arrange for the transfer of patients 
confirmed with Ebola to an ETC in another jurisdiction, including how and where on 
the hospital grounds EMS will receive the patient 
 
 
Chapter 2 – The ConOps Template  19 
• Which public health entity is responsible for identifying where a frontline or 
outpatient facility should direct PUIs (e.g., the assessment hospital or ETC) 
• What coordination is necessary to arrange for interfacility transfers and which 
agencies and organizations are responsible for this coordination, both intrastate and 
interstate 
• Reporting requirements for hospitals assessing PUIs and for hospitals treating patients 
confirmed with Ebola 
• What resources (e.g., PPE, training, funds) the jurisdiction offers hospitals and how 
the hospital coordinates the support 
• How the jurisdiction will coordinate with HHS, CDC, and the regional treatment 
facility if a PUI or healthcare worker tests positive for Ebola 
• How the jurisdiction will coordinate clinical management of patients and incorporate 
CDC subject matter expert recommendations into patient care procedures 
• The actions taken to track patients from the point they enter the healthcare system 
through their courses of care 
References 
• Interim Guidance for U.S. Hospital Preparedness for Patients Under Investigation: or 
with Confirmed Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): A Framework for a Tiered Approach, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/us-hospital-preparedness.html. 
• Guidance on Personal Protective Equipment To Be Used by Healthcare Workers During 
Management of Patients with Ebola Virus Disease in U.S. Hospitals, Including 
Procedures for Putting On (Donning) and Removing (Doffing), 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/procedures-for-ppe.html. 
• Interim Guidance for EMS systems and 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) 




• Identify, Isolate, Inform: Emergency Medical Services Systems and 9-1-1 PSAPs for 
Management of Patients Who Present with Possible Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola) in the 
United States, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/ems-911-patients-with-possible-ebola.pdf. 
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• CDC's Domestic Ebola Supplement to ELC for Infectious Diseases – Building and 
Strengthening Epidemiology, Laboratory and Health Information Systems Capacity in 
State and Local Health Departments (CK14-1401PPHFSUPP15). 
• CDC's PHEP Supplemental for Ebola Preparedness and Response Activities (CDC-FRA-
RP12-12010302SUPP15). 
• ASPR's HPP Ebola Preparedness and Response Activities (CFDA #93.817). 
• ASPR's NETEC Cooperative Agreement (EP-U3R-15-003). Regional Ebola and Other 
Special Pathogen Treatment Centers. 
2.9.6 Regional Ebola and Other Special Pathogen Treatment Centers 
ASPR's HPP FOA outlines the requirements to develop regional Ebola and other special 
pathogen treatment centers in each of the HHS regions. Although the FOA contains 
specifications for the capability and capacity of these centers, planners in each jurisdiction 
must ensure policies and procedures are in place to support the designated hospital. States 
within a region will have written agreements with the state hosting the hospital, or with states 
near the jurisdiction, which will be signed by the jurisdiction's elected officials and health 
officials. The emergency operations centers in the jurisdictions should ensure plans and 
procedures are identified for sharing information related to the transfer of PUIs and patients 
confirmed with Ebola and be prepared to coordinate these transfers. Though many of the 
coordination requirements are covered in the Hospital Tiered Strategy section, you should 
also include the following information: 
• Notification and coordination requirements for 
o Procedures when transferring a patient to the state containing the regional ETC 
o The sending and receiving hospitals and the role of state and local level 
departments in that coordination 
o Procedures among EMS air and ground transportation and state and local EMS 
medical directors 
• Procedures and responsibilities for the state to request air transport (e.g., the state 
would contact the ASPR regional emergency coordinator who will make the 
appropriate notifications regarding air transport) 
• Identification of airports whose management officials have agreed to accept flights 
transporting patients with Ebola 
• Security requirements for a safe and secure patient transfer 
• Dissemination of information to the public 
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• Requirements for coordination when the region has multiple PUIs or and patients 
confirmed with Ebola 
Reference 
ASPR's HPP Ebola Preparedness and Response Activities (CFDA #93.817). 
2.9.7 Hospital Preparation in Support of the Tiered Hospital Strategy2 
This details what the healthcare facilities must do to support the jurisdiction's plan. All 
hospitals should review their staffing needs for providing care to a patient with Ebola. Their 
plan should describe how they will coordinate for and use health professionals from outside 
agencies to fill the gaps in staffing requirements. Details include 
• Frontline healthcare facilities (e.g., urgent care settings or emergency departments) 
must ensure plans outline and staff are trained on the procedures for when a person 
with a relevant exposure history and signs or symptoms compatible with Ebola 
presents to the facility including the following: 
o Who will ensure the hospital staff has contacts for those agencies working on the 
Ebola response, including local and state public health, EMS, and emergency 
management 
o How the staff will identify and isolate this person  
o Which agency the staff will notify to report that they have a PUI 
o How to arrange transportation to an assessment hospital or ETC, what critical 
information must be provided to the transport agency and receiving hospitals, and 
who will provide the information 
o How personnel will access an adequate supply of PPE and be trained on its use 
o How these facilities will safely store and arrange for help with disposing of the 
material used during the initial care of the patient if the patient is later confirmed 
with Ebola 
o The printed and electronic information for staff about inclusion in the monitoring 
program if the patient is determined to have Ebola 
o Who is responsible for ensuring relevant staff are trained and validated on the 
procedures outlined in the plan 
  
                                                          
2 This subsection was added to provide guidance for local facilities. 
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• Assessment hospitals and ETCs designated to receive PUI(s) from various sources 
must ensure plans and procedures cover 
o Hospital notification to expect a PUI(s) and how staff members are informed 
o How the hospital will communicate with the agency transporting the PUI(s) and 
the critical information, including where the transport vehicle will bring the 
patient(s) 
o Where the transporting staff will decontaminate their vehicle, doff their PPE, and 
safely dispose of waste after transporting the patient(s) 
o How patients without Ebola will be distributed if they must be moved from the 
area of the facility designated to receive the PUI 
o How the hospital will work with public health officials from the initial 
notification about the PUI(s) through the assessment, collection, and testing of 
laboratory specimens, and other components of the evaluation 
o How personnel will access an adequate supply of PPE and be trained on its use 
o How the staff will manage pediatric or pregnant PUIs, including newborns born to 
Ebola-infected women 
o How hospital leaders will arrange for assistance when multiple PUIs present to 
the facilities 
o Who is responsible for ensuring relevant staff are trained and validated on the 
procedures outlined in the plan 
• Plans covering what to do when a PUI tests positive should include 
o How to manage staff detailed to care for the patient such as how the staff will be 
monitored for Ebola symptoms and how monitoring data will be shared with 
public health authorities 
o Coordination of supplies (e.g., PPE), laboratory, and waste management issues 
with appropriate authorities 
o Coordination of requests for and use of unapproved medical products (e.g., 
investigational therapeutics, products authorized for emergency use) with 
appropriate local, state, and federal authorities 
o Coordination with appropriate public health officials if the hospital receives more 
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o Arrangement of interfacility transport to an ETC, if needed 
o Specifics about who will communicate with staff, the public, and current patients 
and their families about the care of the Ebola-infected patient in the facility 
o Identify and describe the actions that will be taken to assess and provide mental 
health services for the healthcare workers, patient, patient family members, and 
general public 
2.9.8 Enhancing Infection Control Procedures 
This section details how the jurisdiction will work to improve infection control practices in 
all healthcare settings, including how the jurisdiction will 
• Expand the partners in infection control advisory groups (e.g., PHEP and HPP 
preparedness, EMS, mortuary services) 
• Create and maintain a list of infection control points of contact in each healthcare 
facility, as well as the regulatory/licensing oversight authorities and include them in 
communications about infection control practices for managing patients with Ebola 
• Perform targeted assessments of general infection control competencies in healthcare 
facilities, identify gaps, and help correct them by developing improvement plans and 
strategies to address the gaps 
• Coordinate access to training for infection control practitioners in healthcare facilities 
and for EMS 
• Share promising practices and other information about infection control in healthcare 
settings with healthcare agencies and healthcare workers in the jurisdiction 
References 
• Interim Guidance for Environmental Infection Control in Hospitals for Ebola Virus, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/cleaning/hospitals.html. 
• CDC's Domestic Ebola Supplement to ELC for Infectious Diseases – Building and 
Strengthening Epidemiology, Laboratory and Health Information Systems Capacity in 
State and Local Health Departments (CK14-1401PPHFSUPP15). 
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2.9.9 Laboratory Services Support and Coordination 
This section details what laboratory capability and capacity are available in the jurisdiction 
and how healthcare organizations can coordinate for laboratory support. 
Clinical laboratories, especially those in Ebola assessment hospitals and ETCs, should have 
demonstrated that they are prepared to provide timely and sufficient diagnostic testing to 
ensure patient care is not compromised and that medical evaluation is not delayed while 
patients undergo assessment and prior to availability of Ebola laboratory testing results. In 
the United States, most patients evaluated for Ebola have had other illnesses such as malaria, 
influenza and other respiratory illnesses, typhoid fever, and other bacterial or viral 
infections.1 A clinician should determine specific testing according to the patient presentation 
and travel history, and assessment and treatment facilities should consider how they might 
perform these laboratory tests safely. At a minimum, this testing should include a complete 
blood count (CBC); glucose and potassium concentrations; malaria testing (smear or rapid 
tests); and testing for influenza virus and liver function. 
CDC has posted "Guidance for U.S. Laboratories for Managing and Testing Routine Clinical 
Specimens When There Is a Concern About Ebola Virus Disease" and "Guidance for 
Collection, Transport and Submission of Specimens for Ebola Virus Testing." Jurisdiction 
laboratory managers can provide the following to help planners: 
• Contact information for laboratories willing to complete all patient testing 
(e.g., CBC, glucose, potassium, malaria exam, influenza test, liver function tests) 
• Procedures for collecting, packing, and shipping samples from PUI(s) to the state 
public health laboratory or the jurisdiction nearest to the Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN) laboratory  
• A list of procedures hospital laboratories should follow to rule out or confirm that a 
patient has Ebola. *NOTE: If there is a clinical suspicion of Ebola, a determination 
whether a patient is or is not a PUI should be made in consultation with public health 
officials as quickly as possible to ensure that patient care is not compromised. CDC 
recommends conducting Ebola testing only for people who meet the criteria for PUI 
(www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/evaluating-patients/case-definition.html). 
• Procedures for confirmation of Ebola—if the hospital chooses to use a commercial 
Ebola virus test, duplicate specimens are submitted to an LRN facility. (The Food and 
Drug Administration has authorized a number of Ebola diagnostic tests for us under 
its Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) authority). The LRN facility will send a 
specimen to CDC for confirmation if needed 
• The mechanisms to transport specimens to laboratories in neighboring jurisdictions if 
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• Any laboratory specific supplies and training available from the jurisdiction related to 
an Ebola response and procedures for requesting the supplies and training for staff 
• Procedures for requesting a site-specific assessment of risk, laboratory safety 
procedures, and mitigation controls for handling Ebola specimens. Note: The new 
biosafety officer acquired through the ELC Ebola supplemental grant will be 
responsible for helping hospital laboratories perform biosafety risk assessments and  
identify best practices 
References 
• Karwowski et al. Clinical Inquiries Regarding Ebola Virus Disease Received by CDC —
United States, July 9–Nov 15, 2014. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. Dec 5, 2014. 63 
(Early Release);1–5), 
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6349a8.htm?s_cid=mm6349a8_w. 
• Guidance for U.S. Laboratories for Managing and Testing Routine Clinical Specimens 
When There Is a Concern About Ebola Virus Disease. 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/laboratories/safe-specimen-management.html. 
• Guidance for Collection, Transport and Submission of Specimens for Ebola Virus 
Testing, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/laboratories/specimens.html. 
• Interim Guidance for Preparing Ebola Assessment Hospitals, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/hospitals.html. 
• Interim Guidance for Preparing Ebola Treatment Centers, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/treatment-centers.html. 
• Ebola Diagnostic Tests Available under Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs), 
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/ucm182568.htm. 
2.9.10 Waste Management Considerations 
This section provides details on the jurisdiction's Category-A Infectious Hazardous Waste 
packaging and transport requirements, which might involve contact among state 
transportation officials, waste disposal vendors, hospital environmental staff, and possibly 
interstate partners. Facilities unable to treat waste on site working with their state agencies 
must develop a waste management plan for handling, packaging, and disposal (final 
disposition) of Ebola-associated medical waste. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) 
website has information about the Category A Infectious Substance Permit for Ebola and a 




(type 16279 in the special permit field). 
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For facilities that can treat Ebola-associated waste on site, treated waste is no longer 
considered infectious waste (state and local regulations might be stricter) and can be disposed 
of according to state and local regulations regarding solid waste. Other information related to 
Category-A Hazardous Waste disposal include 
• Legal and regulatory requirements related to the handling, packaging, transportation, 
and disposal of Category-A Hazardous Waste 
• Capabilities available in the jurisdiction to assist healthcare facilities in arranging for 
vendors to remove Category-A Hazardous Waste 
• Measures taken to ensure waste removed from locations in the community where 
Ebola-positive patients lived and is handled and disposed of properly 
References 
• Safety Advisory: Packaging and Handling Ebola Virus Contaminated Infectious Waste 
for Transportation to Disposal Sites, 
http://phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_CA032C97BEEB7978BFDD83ACF8991
F28CAE20000/filename/ebola_sa.pdf. 
• Interim Guidance for U.S. Residence Decontamination and Removal of Contaminated 
Waste, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/prevention/cleaning-us-homes.html. 
DOT. Guidance for Transporting Ebola Contaminated Items, a Category A Infectious 
Substance. 
• DOT. Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 100-1999; 49 CFR 172.700; 49 
CFR 173.134[a][5]). 
• Interim Guidance for Environmental Infection Control in Hospitals for Ebola Virus, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/cleaning/hospitals.html. 
• Procedures for Safe Handling and Management of Ebola-Associated Waste, 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/cleaning/handling-waste.html. 
• Ebola-Associated Waste Management, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/medical-waste-
management.html.  
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2.9.11 PPE Resources 
PPE plays an important part in an Ebola response for any worker who has the potential for 
exposure to the blood or bodily fluids of an Ebola-infected patient. The jurisdiction's ConOps 
should include 
• Measures taken to create a supply of PPE for managing a patient with suspected or 
confirmed Ebola and the procedures to request the resources 
• Recommended training on PPE, availability of the training in the jurisdiction, and the 
procedures for requesting the training 
• Procedures for procuring PPE contained within the Strategic National Stockpile 
This section will often involve coordination among a jurisdiction's healthcare coalitions, 
healthcare systems, and EMS agencies. 
References 
• Guidance on Personal Protective Equipment to Be Used by Healthcare Workers During 
Management of Patients with Ebola Virus Disease in U.S. Hospitals, Including 
Procedures for Putting On (Donning) and Removing (Doffing), 
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/ppe/guidance.html. 
• Considerations for U.S. Healthcare Facilities to Ensure Adequate Supplies of Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) for Ebola Preparedness, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-
us/ppe/supplies.html. 
2.9.12 Considerations for Outpatient Settings 
This section can be used to outline the roles and preparation of outpatient settings within the 
jurisdiction. 
References 
• Ebola Interim Guidance for Outpatient and Ambulatory Care, 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/Preparedness/CurrentHazards/Events/EbolaResponse/Doc
uments/outpatient/outpatient-ambulatorycare-ebola-preparedness-guidelines.pdf. 
• Identify, Isolate, Inform: Ambulatory Care Evaluation of Patients with Possible Ebola 
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2.9.13 Mortuary Affairs 
This section varies depending on the type of system the jurisdiction uses to manage mortuary 
affairs. CDC guidance includes recommendations on handling remains, and it is highly 
recommended this guidance be followed. The ConOps should include 
• Information about how to contact state/local legal counsel to help with issues 
involving discrepancies between groups on burial procedures (mandated closed 
casket and/or cremation) or measures to take if the body is not claimed 
• Any action by the jurisdiction to contract with one funeral home to handle the 
disposition of remains for any Ebola-related deaths in the jurisdiction 
Reference 
Guidance for Safe Handling of Human Remains of Ebola Patients in U.S. Hospitals and 
Mortuaries, www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/guidance-safe-handling-human-remains-ebola-
patients-us-hospitals-mortuaries.html. 
2.10 Coordination, Administrative Preparedness, Accounting, and 
Communication 
2.10.1 Coordination 
Each agency or organization listed as responsible for actions in the ConOps also should be 
responsible for clearly defining what is required from other staff or agencies to properly 
execute these actions. The plan should include the events that trigger the coordination 
process, important decision points in the operation's timeline, what form of communication 
will be used to facilitate coordination, and the people responsible for conducting the 
coordination. 
2.10.2 Administrative Preparedness 
Current HPP and PHEP funding agreements define administrative preparedness as 
"The process of ensuring fiscal and administrative authorities and practices that govern 
funding, procurement, contracting, hiring, and legal capabilities necessary to mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from public health emergencies can be accelerated, modified, 
streamlined, and accountably managed at all levels of government." 
In the Ebola ConOps the jurisdiction will outline what MOUs, agreements, or pre-contracting 
is in place at that level and those required at the local level. Examples my include pre-
contracts with hazardous waste cleanup companies for the decontamination of residents or a 




Chapter 2 – The ConOps Template  29 
2.10.3 Accounting 
The jurisdiction's financial planners should determine how agencies and organizations should 
capture and report the cost of response operations, submit requests for reimbursement, and 
provide other information about budget and finance operations. This should include actions 
for retroactive reimbursement for early Ebola preparedness efforts. 
2.10.4 Communication 
The communication section of the ConOps not only details how information should be 
communicated and shared with organizations and agencies within the system, but also how 
information will be shared with the public. To facilitate sharing of information between 
organizations and agencies within the system, the ConOps should include 
• A reminder for hospital staff about the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) requirement for maintaining confidentiality of patient 
information. This is especially important for PUIs or patients confirmed with Ebola 
and their families 
• How public health and hospital leaders, in conjunction with their public information 
officers, will determine how and who will share information with the public regarding 
PUIs and patients confirmed with Ebola 
• Contact information for agencies engaged in Ebola preparedness and response, along 
with what triggers the need to contact each agency 
• Contact information for local agency/organization staff who the jurisdiction response 
staff will coordinate with to transport a patient confirmed with Ebola 
• How agencies and organizations will interact with each other and CDC regarding how 
PUIs or patients confirmed with Ebola are being treated 
• If the jurisdiction uses systems similar to Epi-X or the Health Alert Network, provide 
information on who can enroll in those systems and details on how to enroll 
At a minimum, the jurisdiction should maintain contact information for all hospitals, EMS 
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Chapter 3 – Training and Exercises 
3.1 Recommendations for Conducting Training 
Though sections in the ConOps plan recommend training people on certain elements applicable 
to each section, personnel also need to receive training on how the jurisdiction will execute this 
plan. Leaders must understand how their organizations and agencies contribute to the proper 
functioning of the regional hospital tiered system. All personnel must understand what their role 
is in ensuring operations are coordinated with other partners and their responsibilities in ensuring 
proper communication between these partners. Look at methods to ensure that the training 
regarding roles and responsibilities under the ConOps is sustainable (e.g., recorded webinars, 
online training, detailed presentations) and recommend that personnel take the training before 
conducting exercises. This training should also include how those responsibilities can extend to a 
response related to other infectious diseases and public health emergencies. Documenting the 
training will help identify gaps in educating partners on the various plans and provide the means 
necessary to meet requirements outlined in the FOAs. 
Jurisdictions can send staff from their ETCs or Ebola assessment hospitals to training at the 
National Training and Education Center as outlined in the HPP FOA and grant application 
instructions. 
3.2 Recommendations for Conducting Exercises 
Specific requirements for the frequency and type of exercises are covered in each of the FOA 
and grant application instructions for ELC, PHEP, and HPP. The jurisdiction should outline 
requirements for exercise reporting and capture the results that evaluate personnel and 
procedures related to the plan. Larger scale exercises might focus on response capabilities across 
the system, with the understanding that these might include sectors, agencies, and organizations 
who do not always conduct exercises together. Improvement plans will drive changes to the plan 
and inform training on the plan itself. 
3.3 Final Note 
The ConOps plan must be clearly articulated, trained, and exercised to reduce the likelihood of 
Ebola reaching or spreading in a jurisdiction. The ConOps includes the details necessary for a 
coordinated response at all levels of government and by all involved agencies and organizations 
and should be shared with these critical partners. Conducting planning, training, and exercises 
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Appendix A – Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ASTHO .......................................................... Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 
ASPR................................................................ Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 
CDC ............................................................................. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CIR ......................................................................................... Critical Information Requirement 
PHEP ............................................................................ Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
ConOps ........................................................................................................... concept of operations 
DOT ........................................................................................... U.S. Department of Transportation 
EEI .............................................................................................. Essential Elements of Information 
ELC .................................................................................... Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity 
EMS ..................................................................................................... emergency medical services 
EOC...................................................................................................... emergency operations center 
ESF ..................................................................................................... Emergency Support Function 
ETC ............................................................................................................... Ebola treatment center 
FEMA ..................................................................... U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
CPG ..................................................................................... Comprehensive Planning Guidance 
FOA........................................................................................ Funding Opportunity Announcement 
HIPAA ........................................................... Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HHS...................................................................... U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HPP ........................................................................................... Hospital Preparedness Program 
LRN............................................................................................ Laboratory Response Network 
NIH ................................................................................................ National Institutes of Health 
MOU ............................................................................................... memorandum of understanding 
NACCHO .............................................. National Association of County and City Health Officials 
NASEMSO .......................... National Association of State Emergency Medical Services Officials 
ORAU ....................................................................................... Oak Ridge Associated Universities 
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ORISE ..................................................................... Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 
OSHA .................................................................... Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
POE ................................................................................................................................port of entry 
PPE .................................................................................................... personal protective equipment 
PSAP ...............................................................................................Public Safety Answering Points 
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Appendix B – Definition of Terms 
Administrative Procedures 
The process of ensuring fiscal and administrative authorities and practices that govern funding, 
procurement, contracting, hiring, and legal capabilities necessary to mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from public health emergencies can be accelerated, modified, streamlined, and 
accountably managed at all levels of government. 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance 101 (CPG 101) 
A Federal Emergency Management Agency publication that details the fundamentals of planning 
and developing emergency operations plans. 
Concept of Operations (ConOps) 
A conceptual overview of the processes and steps envisioned in the proper functioning of a 
system or in the proper execution of an operation. This overview also can include responsibilities 
and authorities, available resources, and methods to improve communications and coordination. 
Doffing 
The process of removing used personal protective equipment. 
Donning 
The process of putting on clean personal protective equipment 
Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola)—previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever 
A rare and deadly disease caused by infection with one of the Ebola virus strains. Ebola can 
cause disease in humans and nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and chimpanzees). 
Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) 
A program managed by HHS/ASPR that provides leadership and funding through grants and 
cooperative agreements to states, territories, and eligible municipalities to improve surge 
capacity and enhance community and hospital preparedness for public health emergencies. 
Jurisdiction 
For the purpose of this document the term refers to the state, territorial, and major metropolitan 
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Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement 
A program administered by CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division 
of State and Local Readiness to help public health departments strengthen their abilities to 
respond to all types of public health incidents and build more resilient communities. 
Person Under Investigation (PUI) 
A person who has both consistent signs or symptoms and risk factors as follows should be 
considered a PUI: 
• Elevated body temperature or subjective fever or symptoms, including severe headache, 
fatigue, muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, or unexplained hemorrhage 
AND 
• An epidemiologic risk (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/risk-factors-when-evaluating-
person-for-exposure.html) factor within the 21 days before the onset of symptoms 
Tiered Hospital System in the United States 
To create a coordinated networked approach, state and local health officials, in collaboration 
with hospital and healthcare facility executives, may designate healthcare facilities across the 
state to serve in one of three suggested roles outlined in this guidance document. Frontline 
hospitals screen, isolate and transfer for testing and possibly treatment. Assessment hospitals 
screen, isolate, conduct differential and confirmatory testing and transport to treating facility. 
Ebola treatment center can screen, isolate, conduct all testing and offer treatment under research 
protocols. 
